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Abstract 
This squib presents two puzzles related to an ambiguity found in For-infinitival relative clauses 
(FIRs). FIR’s always receive a modal interpretation even in the absence of any overt modal verb, 
and the modal interpretation seems to come in two distinct types, which can be paraphrased by 
finite relative clauses employing, respectively, the modal auxiliaries should and could. The two 
puzzles presented here concern the compositional analysis of FIRs. Both puzzles arise from the 
fact that the availability of the two readings is constrained by factors that are not otherwise 
known to affect the interpretation of a relative clause. Specifically, we show, first, that “strong” 
determiners require the FIR to be interpreted as a SHOULD-relative while “weak” determiners 
allow both interpretations (the Determiner-Modal Generalization). Secondly, we observe that the 
COULD-interpretation requires a raising (internally headed) structure for the FIR, while the 
SHOULD-interpretation is compatible with either a raising or a more standard matching (externally 
headed) structure (the Raising/Matching Generalization).  
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1. For-Infinitival Relative Clauses 
For-Infinitival Relative clauses (FIRs), exemplified in (1), are non-subject relative clauses whose 
tense head is, as the name suggests, realized by the infinitival to and whose subject position can 
optionally be realized by an overt DP introduced by for.  
 
(1)    Mrs. Schaden found many things (for us) to do. 
 
FIRs appear to invariably receive modal interpretations with a range of meanings that are all 
centered around goals, desires, obligations, and the like (“bouletic” or “deontic”).1 Within this 
range of meanings, FIRs seem to come in two distinct sub-varieties, which differ notably in their 
modal force. The two readings can be brought out by means of contextual factors governing the 
                                                 
1 See Kjellmer (1975). Note that subject-gap infinitival relatives (which are incompatible with for) differ from FIRs 
in a number of respects, not least in having non-modal interpretations available. For instance, the subject-gap 
relative in (i) has a straight realis interpretation, paraphraseable as “the last person who saw Jones alive”. In 
contrast, the FIR in (ii) can only get a modal interpretation, e.g. “the last person that we should/could see”. 
 (i)  the last person to see Jones alive 
 (ii)  the last person (for us) to see 
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particular set of goals or desires with respect to which the FIR is interpreted. We illustrate this in 
(2) employing two different if-conditionals, which signal distinct conversational backgrounds 
(Kratzer 1978, 1981). 
 
(2) a.  Mrs. Schaden found many things for us to do if we want to have a good time. 
… many things that we could do (to achieve the goal of having a good time) 
 b.   Mrs. Schaden found many things for us to do if we want a good grade. 
   … many things that we should do (to achieve the goal of getting a good grade)  
 
As suggested by the paraphrases in (2), the two interpretations of the FIR can be characterized in 
terms of achieving a goal that is salient in the discourse and referenced in the if-clause. In (2)a, 
the goal is to have a good time. Mrs. Schaden has found helpful ideas (things that seem 
enjoyable to do). We could do one of them or all of them, or even find something entirely 
different to do and still achieve our goal of having a good time. In (2)b, the goal is to receive a 
good grade in Mrs. Schaden’s class. Here Mrs. Schaden provides us with a list of requirements 
and to achieve our goal, we have to do all of the many things that she has come up with. 
Concomitant with the difference in goals, we note a switch in the modal force of the FIR. In (2)a, 
the FIR can be faithfully paraphrased with a finite relative clause that employs an existential 
modal such as could while in (2)b, the paraphrase features the universal modal should. Within 
possible world semantics we might describe the two interpretations, then, in terms of 
existentially and universally quantified formulas that are restricted by a bouletic accessibility 
relation, Rb, to worlds in which a contextually salient set of goals are met, (3).2  
 
(3)   a. For many x: Mrs. Schaden found x & ∃w' [wRbw' & we do x in w'] 
 b. For many x: Mrs. Schaden found x & ∀w' [wRbw' → we do x in w'] 
 
The formula in (3)a describes fairly weak truth-conditions. It states that there are many things x 
such that it is possible for us to achieve our goals and also do x. (3)b, on the other hand, states 
that there are many things x such that it is necessary for us to do x in order to achieve our goals. 3 
                                                 
2 As many researchers have noticed, for-infinitivals have a future orientation (Bresnan 1972, Stowell 1982, Pesetsky 
1992). We think that this is due to the fact that bouletic modality is inherently future oriented, i.e. Rb makes only 
worlds accessible that are “future developments” of the world of evaluation. See Portner (1992, 1997, 2009) and von 
Fintel & Iatridou (2007) among others for discussion. 
3 In fact, the truth-conditions stated in (3)a seem too weak to faithfully represent the COULD-reading, which might be 
better approximated by (i). The latter contains a universal formula in which the restrictor and nuclear scope of the 
modal operator are “switched”. (i) states that there are many things such that if we do them, we will achieve our 
goals. 
 
 (i)  For many x: Mrs. Schaden found x & ∀w' [we do x in w' → wRbw'] 
 
Note that (i) does not imply that doing (any of) the things that Mrs. Schaden found is the only way of achieving our 
goals, which makes it considerably weaker than (3)b. It does, however, say that if we do one of these things we will 
achieve our goals, which is stronger than the claim that doing x is consistent with achieving our goal, as (3)a states. 
Since we do not attempt in this squib to derive the meanings of the FIR, we will stick to the weaker version. 
However, we suspect that an explanation for the two puzzles we present might hinge on the choice (and more 
specifically on the way the correct truth conditions for this reading are derived). We note in this connection that 
Bhatt (2006) proposes a semantics for infinitival questions which combines the formulae in (i) and (3)a, and 
(responding to an earlier incarnation of this squib) he uses this semantics as part of an explicit attempt to account for 
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Since each x is such that only worlds in which we do x are worlds in which we achieve our 
goals, we have to do all of them if we want to achieve our goal.  
Throughout the squib we will refer to these two interpretations as COULD- and SHOULD-
readings. Our puzzles concern the availability of these two interpretations. We observe that the 
COULD-reading is constrained by properties of its immediate syntactic environment (Section 2) as 
well as the internal organization of the FIR (Section 3) while the SHOULD-reading is not.4 We 
note, moreover, that the finite counterparts of FIRs, which employ overt modal operators such as 
could and should, are not subject to any of these constraints, indicating that the infinitival nature 
of FIRs contributes in an essential way to the puzzle. 
 
2. A Correlation between Modal Force and Determiner Strength 
We have seen that FIRs can, in principle, have either a COULD- or a SHOULD-interpretation and 
that contextual factors might make one reading more salient than the other. In the present 
section, we observe that the availability of the two readings interacts in a quite surprising way 
with the semantic properties of the determiner of the DP hosting the infinitival relative. 
Specifically, we will show that the generalization stated in (4), which we will refer to as the 
Determiner-Modal Generalization, (DMG) holds. 
 
(4)   DETERMINER MODAL GENERALIZATION (DMG): 
  Strong determiners (and strong interpretations of weak determiners) always induce a 
SHOULD-reading in for-infinitival relative clauses. Weak interpretations of weak 
determiners allow both COULD- and SHOULD-readings.5  
 
2.1 The Basic Correlation 
To see a first illustration of the DMG, consider the contrast in (5). The examples in (5)a all use 
weak determiners and, as suggested by the paraphrases, allow both a COULD- and a SHOULD-
interpretation. In the examples in (5)b, on the other hand, the FIRs are hosted by DPs projected 
from strong determiners. Unlike the examples in (5)a, they allow only the SHOULD-reading of the 
FIR; in all of these cases John has to play against the men if he wants to achieve some goal that 
is salient in the discourse (e.g. prove himself as a good player).  
 
(5) a.  A/many/a few/three/more than three/at most three/sm/etc. men (for John) to play against 
    is/are in the next room.6 
    A/many/a few/three/more than three/at most three/sm/etc. men that John could/should 
    play against is/are in the next room . 
                                                 
the first of the puzzles that we present here. We think that Bhatt’s proposal is an intriguing, if partial, way of 
thinking about the two readings.  
4 In order to fully appreciate the empirical generalizations we will present, it is important to make sure that the 
examples are unambiguously FIRs, rather than instances of the superficially similar VP-adjoined purpose clause 
construction (e.g. I brought the book (along) for you to read). See Faraci (1974), Bach (1982), Jones (1985), 
Huettner (1989). 
5 The distinction between weak and strong determiners goes back to Milsark (1974, 1977) who used the familiar 
classification given by the “there-construction test” to categorize determiners.  
6 We use sm to refer to the phonologically reduced (accentless) version of some. 
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 b.   The/neither/every/both/most/etc. men (for John) to play against are in the next room. 
  The/neither/every/both/most/etc. men that John should play against are next in the next 
room. 
 
One can create particularly striking instances of the DMG if a given context or world 
knowledge is compatible only with one reading and induces oddness under the other. Since the 
differences between the two readings can be rather subtle, we will use such a setup throughout 
the paper. Consider the sentences in (6) as an instructive example.  
 
(6)  Context: From time to time Norman would think about marrying and starting a family. On 
   such occasions, he would visit his sister, where, more often than not, several new women 
   for him to marry would be among the house guests. His sister would then arrange it so 
   that, at some point during the evening,  
 a. … at least one new woman for him to marry would be in the kitchen.  
      At least one woman that he could marry would be in the kitchen. 
  b. … #each new woman for him to marry would be in the kitchen. 
          Each new woman that he should marry would be in the kitchen. 
 
The pragmatics of these examples are such that the SHOULD-reading induced by the strong 
determiners, (6)a, is sensible only if Norman plans to be polygamous. Weak determiners, as in 
(6)b, do not give rise to this effect, because they permit a COULD-interpretation, which is 
pragmatically available: there is nothing odd about a desire for someone to marry (possibly) one 
among a list of candidates.7 
 
2.2 Ambiguous Determiners  
 
It is well-known that weak determiners are ambiguous between a weak and a strong construal 
and that environmental factors determine which construal is present.8 Since we do not have any 
new insight regarding the “weak” and “strong” distinction to offer here, we simply follow 
Diesing (1992) among others in assuming that a DP that is interpreted in a raised position at LF 
is projected from a strong determiner.9 To further illustrate the DMG we show, then, that 
                                                 
7 We know of one class of potential counter-examples to the DMG, namely FIRs whose head NP receives an 
instrument role within the relative, as illustrated in (i). These FIRs seem to get could-readings despite having strong 
determiners.  
 (i) a.  Every pen (*for me) to write with is in the top desk drawer. 
  b.  All the cash to buy books with (has been spent already) 
  c.  Three of the charts to do your homework with (are in the back of the book) 
  d.  Most guns to shoot quail with (have wooden handles) 
While we do not fully understand why this class is exceptional, we suspect the answer has to do with the fact that 
instruments are characterized by having (an intended or de facto) purpose. As such, the salient ordering source is not 
bouletic. If so, something like the universal modal statement that characterizes should-readings of FIRs is actually a 
viable candidate for the meanings of (i) after all. (e.g., “For every pen x such that one writes with x in all of the 
worlds that are compatible with x’s intended purpose (i.e. the pen is used in its intended manner), x is on the table”.) 
8 See Diesing (1992), McNally & Van Geenhoven (1998) among others for discussion. 
9 This could be derived from the assumption that only DPs that are predicative can be interpreted in their base 
position inside the VP, see e.g. Van Geenhoven (1998). 
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environments that govern the distribution of strong and weak determiners also govern the 
availability of COULD- and SHOULD-readings of FIRs. Specifically, we show that environments 
that are known to allow only strong readings of weak determiners also allow only SHOULD-
readings, (2.2.1), while environments that allow only weak interpretations of weak determiners 
allow both readings, (2.2.2).  
 
2.2.1 Strong Readings of Weak Determiners Allow Only SHOULD-Readings of FIRs 
 
A. Individual vs. Stage-Level Predicates: Indefinite subjects of individual-level predicates are 
known to receive only strong interpretations (Milsark 1974, Diesing 1992, Kratzer 1995). The 
DMG leads us to expect that FIRs modifying such subjects are limited to SHOULD-readings. The 
contrast in (7) suggests that this expectation is indeed borne out. 
 
(7) a.  Several/many/a few women (for Norman) to marry are learning French. 
   Several/many/a few women that Norman could /#should marry are learning French. 
 b. # Several/many/a few women (for Norman) to marry know French.  
   Several/many/a few women that Norman could/#should marry know French.  
 
The oddness of (7)b indicates that the COULD-reading (which would have been sensible) is not 
available for FIRs that modify subject of individual level predicates such as know French. The 
SHOULD-reading is available but is odd for the same reason that (6)b is. In contrast, the FIR in 
(7)a modifies the subject of the stage-level predicate currently learning French. As such, it is 
felicitous because the COULD-reading is available. 
 
B. Positive-Polarity some: Positive polarity items like some necessarily take scope over clause-
mate negation. Since taking scope over not brings a PPI-indefinite out of the scope of existential 
closure, the weak interpretation of the indefinite is unavailable in negated clauses. Combining 
these considerations with the DMG, we are led to expect that only a SHOULD-reading will be 
possible for a FIR modifying a some-DP in a negated clause. A simple, non-polarity indefinite is, 
in contrast, predicted to have both options. This expectation is borne out by the contrast in (8). 
While (8)a can be understood as asserting the lack of availability of anyone that I can marry, (8)b 
seems to imply the existence of someone whom I am supposed to marry.  
 
(8) a.  A person (for me) to marry doesn’t exist. 
    A person that I could/should marry doesn’t exist. 
 b. # Someone (for me) to marry doesn’t exist. 
   Someone that I could/should marry doesn’t exist.  
 
C. Reconstruction into Infinitival versus Small Clauses: Williams (1983) observed that an 
infinitival complement of seem allows scope reconstruction of an indefinite subject, whereas a 
small clause complement doesn’t.10 The unavailability of reconstruction in the latter case implies 
that a raised small clause subject is necessarily interpreted in a derived position and, thus, given 
the characterization of the weak/strong distinction, DPs that allow in principle both a weak and 
                                                 
10 See Johnson&Tomioka (1998) for discussion.  
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strong construal are necessarily strong in this environment. The DMG thus leads us to expect that 
the COULD-reading of an FIR will be unavailable if seem takes a small clause complement but not 
if it takes an infinitival complement. The contrast in (9) suggests that this is indeed the case.  
 
(9) a.   Three hotels (for us) to stay at tonight seem to be pretty full. 
   Three hotels that we could/#should stay at tonight seem to be pretty full. 
 b. # Three hotels (for us) to stay at tonight seem pretty full.  
   Three hotels that we could/#should stay at tonight seem pretty full.  
 
(9)b is quite odd. It conveys that we ought to stay at three hotels, each of which is pretty full. 
(9)a, on the other hand, is perfectly felicitous (if we imagine a list of hotels under consideration) 
and simply conveys that three hotels we could stay at are pretty full. 
 
2.2.2 Weak Readings of Weak Determiners Allow both COULD- and SHOULD-Interpretations 
 
In the previous sub-section we observed that environments that impose “strong” interpretations 
on weak quantifiers disallow the COULD-reading of an FIR associated with such a quantifier. 
Here we show that environments that impose a “weak” interpretation on a weak quantifier allow 
both readings. 
  
A. There-construction: Weak interpretations of weak determiners are forced in the “there- 
construction” (Milsark 1974 and much subsequent work). The data in (10), which again employ 
two different if-conditionals to bring out the two readings, indicate that FIRs that modify weak 
indefinites appearing in the existential there-construction allow both readings of FIRs.  
 
(10) a. There are several/many/a few/etc. problems (for you) to write about if you are looking 
    for an interesting topic. 
  There are several/many/a few/etc. problems that you could write about … 
 b. There are several/many/a few/etc. problems (for you) to write about if you want your 
book to be the authoritative source on the topic. 
   There are several/many/a few/etc. problems that you should write about … 
 
B. Possessive have: The complement of possessive have, just like the coda position of the 
existential there construction, is not capable of hosting strong quantifiers, as illustrated in (11)a. 
Indefinites, on the other hand, can serve as complements of possessive have but receive a weak 
interpretation, (11)b.11 With this in mind, the data in (12) show, again, that a FIR modifying a 
weak indefinite can have SHOULD- and COULD-readings.  
 
(11) a. *The deceased has every/each/most/etc. heir(s) in my hometown. 
  b.  The deceased has many/several/three/etc. heirs in my hometown.  
 
(12)  a. The deceased has many heirs for us to talk to about suing the tobacco company. 
    The deceased has many heirs that we could talk to about suing the tobacco company.  
                                                 
11 See Freeze (1992) and Iatridou (1996) among others.  
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  b. The deceased has many heirs for us to console (so we'd better get started)  
   The deceased has many heirs that we should console, so we’d better get started.  
 
These data show that optionally weak determiners license a COULD-interpretation only when they 
receive a weak interpretation. From this it is clear that it is a property of the weak reading itself 
and not a simple feature of the class of determiners that can have weak readings that allows the 
COULD-reading. Thus, an explanation for the ambiguity of FIRs must be sensitive to the 
properties of the environment that drive the distinction between weak and strong determiners. 
What makes the DMG especially unexpected is the fact that determiners are not known to 
interact with quantificational elements (in particular modal operators) inside a relative clause in 
this way.12 To see this, we only need to look at the finite counterparts of our FIRs. That is, even 
though finite relatives with overt modals have readings that seem to be exact paraphrases of for-
infinitival relatives, they do not display any such dependency. In particular, strong determiners 
are perfectly acceptable with an existential modal inside a finite relative clause:  
 
(13) Every/most/several of the topics that you could write about are on page four.  
 
In other words, there is nothing inherent to determiner strength or to modal force that should 
result in a dependency such as the DMG. Moreover, the standard compositional treatment of 
determiners and relative clauses provides no direct way in which the two could interact. 
Determiners take NPs as arguments and quantify over entities that satisfy the property denoted 
by the NP. Relative clauses are NP adjuncts, which combine with the NP intersectively and 
simply narrow the domain of quantification.  
 
 
(14)    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
That the quantifier is able to influence how the narrowing is to be done (i.e. by enforcing the use 
of a universal or an existential modal predicate) is therefore puzzling and presents a challenge to 
the compositional analysis of determiners and/or relative clause integration. The task, then, is to 
identify what it is about the modal dimension of FIRs and the way they are combined with their 
host DP such that they gives rise to the DMG.  
 
                                                 
12 The DMG is somewhat reminiscent of the constraint that only “maximality-preserving” determiners can project 
DPs that host amount relative clauses (Grosu & Landman 1998). Additionally, see Koster-Moeller&Hackl(2008) for 
an argument that determiners can interact scopally with operators inside the relative clause that they host. However, 
both of these interactions, though puzzling in their own right, are of a different type from the DMG.   
Every 
NP 
DP 
D 
CP NP 
topic for you to write about 
λx. ∀w' [wRbw' → you write about x in w']   
λx. x is a topic & ∀w' [wRbw' → you write about x in w']   
λFet. ∀x[x is a topic & ∀w'[wRbw' → you write about x in w'] → F(x)]   
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3. A Correlation between Modal Force and Raising/Matching structures of FIRs  
 
In this section, we discuss a second unexpected constraining factor for the two readings of FIRs. 
We show, specifically, that the COULD-reading of an FIR is available only if the head NP is 
interpreted inside, rather than external to, the FIR. That implies that the FIR has a raising 
structure. We summarize this in (15) and refer to it as the “Raising/Matching Generalization, 
(RMG).” 
 
(15)  RAISING/MATCHING GENERALIZATION (RMG): 
  For an FIR to make a COULD-interpretation available, it needs to have a raising structure, 
and cannot be adjoined to a matching external NP. SHOULD-interpretations, on the other 
hand, are compatible with both a raising and a matching structure. 
 
To set the stage, we take, following a long tradition of work on relative clauses,  
“reconstruction” (connectivity) effects such as the ability to bind an anaphor, as in (16)a, to 
indicate the availability of an internally headed (“raising”) structure, sketched in (17)a, in which 
the NP that is modified by the relative clause originates inside the relative clause (Carlson 1977, 
Sauerland 1998, Bhatt 2002, Hulsey & Sauerland 2006; cf. also Kayne 1994, Vergnaud 1974, 
Williamson 1987).13 The absence of a Condition C effect, exemplified in (16)b, on the other 
hand, indictes the availability of a “matching” structure in which the relative clause modifies a 
relative-clause-external NP. 14 
 
(16) a. Mary looked at every picture of himselfi that Johni sent. 
 b. Mary looked at every picture of Johni that hei sent.  
 
(17) a.  … every [REL. CLAUSE […INTERNAL NP picture of himselfi]j that Johni sent t(picture of himselfi)j]. 
 b. … every [EXTERNAL NP picture of Johni] [REL. CLAUSE […INTERNAL NP —]j that hei sent t(⎯)j].  
 
On the assumption that both types of structure are available in principle, we assume that ordinary 
relative clauses are structurally ambiguous. However, for a relative clause like the one in (16)a 
with an anaphor inside the head NP, an externally headed structure like (17)b is unavailable, 
blocked by the impossibility of satisfying Condition A. Conversely, a relative clause like the one 
in (16)b cannot have a (purely) internally headed structure as in (17)a, owing to the copy of the 
R-expression in the trace position which would be expected to result in a Condition C violation.  
FIRs show the same kinds of reconstruction effects that finite relative clauses do, as can be 
seen in (18). We take this to indicate that they, too, can in principle be either of the raising or 
matching kind. 
 
                                                 
13 The NP containing the anaphor then is at the head of a chain internal to the relative clause. Consequently, the 
anaphor is expected to be able to find an antecedent local to the trace position, in accord with observations of Barss 
(1986). We follow others (e.g. Chomsky 1993, Fox 1999) in assuming that Barss’ generalization results from the 
copy theory of movement, although nothing here hinges on this assumption. 
14 Whether matching relative clauses also have an identical NP (modulo Vehicle Change of the proper name [Fiengo 
& May 1994]) inside the relative clause (hence the label “matching”) or simply a null operator is orthogonal to our 
argument.  
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(18) a.  Mary saw a picture of himselfi for Johni to send to his parents. 
 b.  Mary saw a picture of Johni for himi to send to his parents. 
 
However, as stated in the RMG and unlike their finite counterparts, FIRs display a sensitivity to 
the difference between raising and matching structures with regard to their modal interpretation. 
Specifically, only raising FIRs allow for a COULD-reading. We present three sets of data in 
support of this claim: obligatory reconstruction effects, Condition A effects with matrix 
antecedents, and extraposition effects.  
 
A. Obligatory Reconstruction Effects with FIRs: We have seen that run of the mill relative 
clauses can either have a raising or matching structure depending on the specific needs at hand. 
The RMG however, leads us to expect that FIRs will be more constrained. Specifically, we 
expect FIRs under the COULD-reading (but not under the SHOULD-reading) to yield obligatory 
reconstruction effects. That is, we expect the COULD-reading to disappear whenever a raising 
structure is unavailable. Thus, an FIR for which reconstruction of the head NP would yield a 
Condition C violation is expected to lack a COULD-reading. In contrast the SHOULD-reading is 
expected to be unaffected in such environments. We illustrate this in (19).  
 
(19) a. There are many facts about Johni for himi to tell his superiors  
   … #if he wants to impress them. 
    … and so he’d better get started. 
    There are many things about Johni that hei  could/should tell his superiors … 
 
  b. There are many facts about himselfi for Johni to tell his superiors. 
   … if he wants to impress them. 
    … and so he’d better get started. 
    There are many facts about himselfi that Johni could/should tell his superiors ... 
 
 
The FIR in (19)a has only a SHOULD-reading, if John and him are understood as co-referential. 
According to the RMG, this is because the (purely internally-headed) raising structure is 
unavailable: reconstruction of the head NP facts about John would yield a Condition C violation. 
If we replace the pronoun with an anaphor and reverse the order of the anaphor and the R-
expression, as in (19)b, reconstruction is possible (in fact necessary to satisfy Condition A) and 
the FIR can have either a COULD- or a SHOULD-reading.15 
A particularly striking illustration can be given with FIRs in which the SHOULD-reading is 
structurally determined through an anti-reconstruction environment while at the same time 
pragmatically disfavored. The contrast in (20)a,b is an example of this sort.16 
 
                                                 
15 Judgments about reconstruction effects are known to be subtle and moreover subject to some variation across 
speakers. We believe, however, that these correlations hold. That is, to the extent that speakers get basic 
reconstruction effects with relative clauses (e.g. Condition C violations) they also judge that the COULD-reading 
disappears when reconstruction is not possible.  
16 All capital letters is used here to indicate phonological prominence. 
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(20) SPEAKER A:  It is very difficult for a potential bride to gain the approval of Norman’s 
mother. In fact, she probably thinks there aren't any women at all who are good enough for 
him. 
 SPEAKER B: That's not what she thinks… 
 a. #She thinks there are several friends of Normani’s DOCTOR for himi to marry.  
   … there are several friends of his doctor that Norman could/#should marry. 
 b.  She thinks there are several friends of hisi DOCTOR for Normani to marry. 
    … there are several friends of Norman’s doctor that he could/#should marry.   
 
Since Norman would not plausibly be expected to marry more than one friend of his doctor, the 
SHOULD-reading is pragmatically disfavored in (20)a,b and only the COULD-reading is sensible. 
The COULD-reading is, however, precluded in (20)a because the internally headed structure, 
sketched in (21)a, is required to generate it (in accord with the RMG), and this structure would 
yield a condition C violation. The only available structure for (20)a, then, is the externally 
headed (21)b, which – according to the RMG – is compatible only with the SHOULD-reading. 
 
(21) a.  *… several [[…Internal NP friends of Normani’s doctor]j for himi to marry t(friends of Ni’s doctor)j ]. 
 b. #… several [EXTERNAL NP friends of Normani’s doctor]j [[…internal NP —]j for himi to marry t(⎯)j].  
 
(20)a therefore produces the same oddness that we observed in sentences like (6)b. In (20)b, on 
the other hand, reconstruction is possible – i.e. the internally headed structure in (22) is not 
blocked by any binding condition – and consequently the sentence is felicitous. 
  
(22)    … several [[…Internal NP friends of hisi doctor]j for Normani to marry t(friends of hisi’s doctor)j ]. 
 
This pattern is quite surprising in light of the fact that reconstruction is, in general, optional 
and not obligatory in relative clauses. Indeed, the finite paraphrases of our FIRs do not display a 
dependency between the possibility/necessity of reconstruction and modal force, (23).  
 
(23) a.  There are many facts about himselfi that Johni could/should tell his superiors. 
  b.  There are many facts about Johni that hei could/should tell his superiors. 
 
B. Condition A Effects with FIRs: Given the RMG, we expect FIRs to give rise to the COULD-
reading only if they have a raising structure. Since in a raising structure, the head NP is 
interpreted inside the relative clause, an anaphor inside the head NP might not be close enough to 
be bound by a matrix antecedent (i.e. it might not satisfy the locality requirement imposed by 
Condition A).17 If so, then we would expect the COULD-reading to be unavailable when the head 
of an FIR contains an anaphor whose antecedent is a matrix binder. In that situation, a matching 
                                                 
17 Specifically, in a (purely) internally headed structure like (i), we expect the anaphor to be too deeply embedded to 
take the matrix antecedent. In contrast, an anaphor in an NP that is external to the relative clause as in (ii) can be 
bound by the matrix antecedent: 
(i) MATRIX ANTECEDENTi ... [DP Determiner [REL. CLAUSE [... Internal NP ... anaphori ] .. 
(ii) MATRIX ANTECEDENTi ... [DP Determiner [EXTERNAL NP ... anaphori ][REL. CLAUSE [... Internal NP — ].  
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structure would be forced — in turn forcing the SHOULD-reading. (25) shows that this expectation 
is indeed borne out. The head NP contains a reflexive pronoun whose antecedent is in the matrix 
clause. This forces the head NP to be interpreted external to the FIR, which, in turn, 
disambiguates the FIR toward the SHOULD-reading. The COULD-reading reappears if we replace 
the reflexive with a normal pronoun, (24). 
 
(24)    There seem to the bossi to be many stories about himi for you to write up. 
  …if you feel like writing something for the newsletter.  
  …if you're interested in keeping your job.  
    There seem to the boss to be many stories about himself that you could/should write up.  
(25)   There seem to the bossi to be many stories about himselfi for you to write up,  
  # …if you feel like writing something for the newsletter.  
  …if you're interested in keeping your job.  
  There seem to the boss to be many stories about himself that you could/should write up. 
 
Again, we can observe that the correlation between satisfying Condition A external to the 
relative clause and existential/universal modal force inside the relative clause holds only for 
FIRs. That is, finite counterparts of our FIRs can be of the should or could variety irrespective of 
an anaphor on the NP that is bound by an antecedent in the matrix.   
 
(26) a.  There seem to the bossi to be many stories about himi that you could/should write up. 
  b. There seem to the bossi to be many stories about himselfi that you could/should write up. 
 
C. Extraposition Effects with FIRs: Extraposition of a relative clause is possible only if the 
relative clause has a matching structure (Hulsey & Sauerland 2006; among others). This can be 
seen, for instance, in the unacceptability of (27)a, which features a Condition A violation due to 
the fact that reconstruction of the head NP picture of himself is blocked by extraposition.  
 
(27) a. *I saw a picture of himselfi yesterday that Johni likes. 
 b.   I saw a picture of himi yesterday that Johni likes.  
 
FIRs can be extraposed just like finite relative clauses. However, given the fact that extraposition 
blocks raising and our argument that the COULD-interpretation requires a raising structure, we 
expect the COULD-reading to be unavailable for extraposed FIRs and the SHOULD-reading to be 
unaffected. This expectation is again borne out as can be seen in (28).  
 
(28) a. # Joe spotted some cigarettes just now for you to smoke. 
       Joe spotted some cigarettes just now that you could/#should smoke. 
 b.   Joe just spotted some cigarettes for you to smoke. 
    Joe just spotted some cigarettes that you could/#should smoke. 
 
As before, finite counterparts of our FIRs behave differently. In particular, extraposing a finite 
modal relative clause has no effect on the availability of weak modal force: 
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(29) Joe spotted some cigarettes just now that you could smoke. 
 
The exraposition data, then, as well as the Condition C and Condition A effects we saw above, 
suggest that the modal force of FIRs is dependent on their structural make-up. Specifically, our 
observations suggest that the COULD-reading is available only for FIRs that have a head-internal 
(raising) structure while the SHOULD-reading is compatible with both raising and matching 
structures (the RMG). This dependency is rather surprising since the quantificational force of a 
modal clause is not known to depend on the location in which an NP is interpreted. NPs and 
modal operators do, of course, interact — for instance in de dicto/de re ambiguities.  However, in 
such cases it is the meaning of the NP that varies depending on the structural relation between 
the modal operator and the NP, and not, as is seemingly the case here, the meaning of the modal 
operator. In fact, quite generally, there is no obvious way in which an NP could affect the 
quantificational force of a modal operator. We can see this again by simply observing that the 
finite counterparts of our FIRs can express both existential and universal force irrespective of 
whether a raising structure is used.  
 
 
4. Summary 
 
We began this squib with the observation that for-infinitival relative clauses are ambiguous 
between two distinct readings, which can be distinguished by their modal force (COULD vs. 
SHOULD). This immediately raises the question of the source of the modal interpretations in FIRs. 
Are there two different (covert) operators that are selected depending on environmental 
properties? Or is there, instead, a single modal operator that is inherent to FIRs — one that gives 
rise to one of the readings in the default case but is subject to a shift of some kind depending on 
properties of the external environment?  
 While we did not attempt to derive the modal ambiguity inherent to FIRs, we did present a 
set of facts that, we think, ought to constrain the solution space. Specifically, we argued for two 
rather striking generalizations involving unexpected constraints on the choice of modal 
interpretation. First, the modal force internal to the FIR is constrained by the strength of the 
determiner (the DMG) — in particular, the COULD-reading requires a weak determiner. Second, 
the COULD-reading is possible only when the FIR has an internally-headed, raising structure and 
does not modify a matching external NP (the RMG).  
 These generalizations are surprising. Why should (and how could) the force of a covert 
modal operator embedded in an FIR be influenced by, on the one hand, a syntactically remote 
lexical item (the determiner external to the FIR), and on the other, the presence or absence of an 
external NP? One obvious question to ask is whether the puzzles are linked – that is, whether 
they both stem from a single source. The DMG and the RMG do not appear to have much in 
common, at least superficially. However, we think it is telling that both generalizations involve 
constraints specific to the COULD-reading. While the SHOULD-reading is possible with any type of 
determiner and with either a raising or a matching structure, COULD-readings require weak 
readings of weak determiners, and no external NP. This at least suggests that the SHOULD-reading 
is the default one, while the COULD-reading arises in a very specialized syntactic and semantic 
environment. 
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